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Abstract
The conflictive targets of achieving security for itself, and assuring basic human 
rights for irregular migrants, have led to paradox EU migration policies. The 
increasing perception of (uncontrolled) immigration as a potential security 
threat has contributed to a migration approach that is driven primarily by 
principles of defence and deterrence. Focusing on the Mediterranean region, 
this article points to five paradoxes, in areas where EU immigration policies and 
actions not only fail to reach their targets but often generate opposite outco-
mes. This comes at high costs in terms of financial contributions and human 
losses. In addition, these policies unnecessarily reduce the EU’s negotiating 
power in other policy fields. The article concludes with recommended changes 
in EU migration policies and calls for an end to the hitherto security-dominated 
approach to migration.
Keywords: European Union, Migration Policy, Stockholm Programme, 
Securitization, Frontex, Readmission Agreements, North Africa, Arab Spring
1. Introduction
2014 is the fĳinal year of the European Union’s Stockholm Programme period. 
Agreed upon by the European Council in December 2009, the Stockholm 
Programme outlined the plans for developing the EU’s Justice and Home 
Afffairs (JHA) policies for the following fĳ ive years, including the main aim 
of ma king the European Union an area of freedom, security, and justice 
(European Council, 2010). This strategy, in its chapters 5 and 6, also tackles 
the question of how to deal with people who intend to enter the EU, whether 
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ways) or enforced (mainly asylum seekers, but also trafffĳ icked persons). 
Maintaining the balance between being open for those who need access 
while protecting itself from uncontrolled irregular influxes of migration is 
the core challenge for the EU, as outlined in those two chapters. 
In the action plan related to the Stockholm Programme, the European 
Commission (2010: 7) stated in April 2010 that ‘[t]he prevention and reduction 
of irregular immigration in line with the Charter of Fundamental Rights is 
equally important for the credibility and success of EU polices [sic!]’.
The years of the Stockholm Programme 2010-2014 have seen major events 
with lasting impact on the EU’s performance in the area of migration and 
asylum policy. First, the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, enacted 
in December 2009, brought fundamental changes to the EU structure as 
a whole, including how it presents itself to, and interacts with, external 
actors (Lavallée, 2011). Second, the pervasive economic crisis in many EU 
Member States has reduced the overall disposition to welcome people from 
other parts of the world and triggered massive population movements from 
southern to northern EU Member States of +45 per cent between 2009 and 
2011 (OECD, 2013: 11). Non-EU immigrants seeking employment now face 
increased competition from EU passport holders with unrestricted EU-wide 
work permissions, which now (as of January 2014) includes Bulgarians and 
Romanians. Third, the accession of Croatia to the EU on 1 July 2013 has 
further extended the external borders of the EU, now being adjacent to 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and – though only with a very short borderline of just 
25 km – Montenegro. With the notable exception of Kosovo, all offfĳ icial 
passport holders from western Balkan states have since December 2010 
enjoyed visa-free access to the EU for up to 90 days (within a period of 
180 days). Fourth, after the inception of Frontex as the European Border 
Protection Agency in 2004, major initiatives aimed at tightening control of 
the EU’s external EU borders have been introduced, the digital fĳ ingerprint 
database EURODAC or the satellite-based surveillance programme EURO-
SUR representing some of the most prominent examples here. 
Finally, the revolutionary events in North Africa as well as in many 
countries of the Middle East have changed signifĳ icantly the political, 
societal, and economic circumstances along the eastern and southern 
Mediterranean coastline. Regimes that over decades had seemed stable 
have suddenly begun to face unprecedented protests from their own peo-
ple. As recent as 2012, indices such as Freedom House or the Bertelsmann 
Transformation Index (BTI) recognized remarkable improvements in the 
state of democracy in several countries – Egypt and Tunisia in particular – 
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though most improvements in Egypt have been rolled back since summer 
2013 (Völkel, 2013). 
These fĳive developments truncate the EU’s migration cooperation, which 
has traditionally viewed North African states as pre-frontier barriers to 
irregular entries. After analysing the altered circumstances under which 
EU migration policy has been formulated and implemented (after both 
the changes brought by the Lisbon Treaty and the changes induced by the 
Arab Spring), fĳ ive paradoxes will be elaborated that show how intentions 
and outcomes in EU migration policies often difffer. The guiding hypothesis 
states that the increasing perception of irregular migration as a threat to 
security (rather than a humanitarian disaster) has led to schizophrenic 
EU actions that exacerbate the problems they are intended to resolve. In 
advancing this argument, the article draws on Düvell’s (2011: 275) idea that 
‘regulations that are meant to prevent unwanted migration often have 
unintended side-efffects and instead encourage irregular migration’. In 
addition, this article argues that such regulations are hardly cost-efffective 
and instead impair the EU’s negotiation positions in other policy fĳ ields. In 
conclusion, the article will develop some ideas for the further development 
of the Stockholm Programme, as its extension and advancement will be 
discussed throughout 2014.
2. EU migration policy under altered circumstances
The revolutionary wave weeping through North Africa and the Middle 
East in winter 2010/2011 was the fĳ irst litmus test for the European Union’s 
fundamentally revised external action structure. Initiated by the Lisbon 
Treaty on 1 December 2009, the creation of the double-hat position of 
the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Afffairs and Security 
Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP), as well 
as head of the European External Action Service (EEAS), was only one 
important shift within the EU power structure. Making the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights compulsory for all EU action – including external 
relations – strengthened the framework for ensuring human rights through 
EU activity (Mink, 2012: 142). Though proclaimed in 2000, it was only Article 
6 of the Lisbon Treaty that eventually defĳined the Charter’s legal obligation. 
This Article also called for the EU’s accession to the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, thereby 
increasing the weight of humanitarian considerations in actions taken by 
the EU. In line with this, the Lisbon Treaty outlines in Article 21 the guiding 
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principles upon which EU foreign policy must be built, namely ‘democracy, 
the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality 
and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter 
and international law’.
These principles gain particular relevance in the discussion about the 
treatment of irregular migrants and the EU’s idea of ‘third safe countries’, 
namely, its strategy of externalizing and extraterritorializing ‘a substantial 
part of their immigration policies […] in exchange of substantial fĳ inancial 
support’ (Caillault, 2012: 133) unto countries such as Libya or Morocco. 
Detention centres were set-up along the Mediterranean coast, Frontex 
arranged for joint missions and trainings with personnel from the neigh-
bourhood, and with the now much-debated European Border Surveillance 
System (EUROSUR) the ‘pre-barrier territories’ are set to become increasin-
gly important to EU border control (Seifffart, 2012). As a result, for 
the case of the EU’s relations with North African countries, we have seen 
the emergence of an extensive system of security governance based on 
such instruments as readmission agreements, capacity building, export of 
surveillance technology, or information exchange. This stems from the fact 
that, in most of those countries, governments view themselves as guardians 
or policemen of European security (in return, of course, for certain favours) 
rather than defenders of their own citizens (Pawlak, 2012: 96).
Given the fact that even after the Arab Spring all countries in the EU’s 
southern neighbourhood ‘lack adequate guarantees, leave a far too large 
margin of appreciation to EU Member States and thus could necessarily 
lead to human rights violations’ (Mink, 2012: 120f.), one would expect a 
drastic curtailing of these policies if EU decision-makers were to take the 
Lisbon Treaty seriously and respect human rights concerns as requested.
2.1 Depoliticized relations and stronger autocracies as 
consequence of EU action
The Lisbon Treaty also provides for an increased standing of the European 
Parliament (EP) and the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) in external afffairs 
(Kaunert and Léonard, 2012: 16). Protocol 24 of the Lisbon Treaty stipulates 
that the CJEU ‘has jurisdiction to ensure that in the interpretation and appli-
cation of Article 6 […] the law is observed by the European Union’.1 Drawing 
primarily on Articles 77 to 79 and 218(6) of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU), the EP ‘has often voiced concerns over 
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external cooperation objectives in the JHA fĳ ield being implemented at the 
expense of human rights and civil liberties’ (Trauner and Carrapico, 2012: 8). 
This clearly has made the work of EU diplomats in countries with dubious 
democratic standards more difffĳ icult. In the case of Egypt, for example, the 
EP called upon the Commission in March 2013 to stop the imbursement of 
EU support as long as the (then Morsi) government failed to meet minimum 
democratic standards (European Parliament, 2013). Discrete discussions 
between representatives from the EU and the Egyptian government now 
must grapple with the Sword of Damocles resulting from possible EP 
inquiries into what exactly is going on. Similar problems arise with other 
mediocre human rights performers. In consequence, partner governments 
will be more hesitant to share ideas and plans with the EEAS as absolute 
confĳidentiality cannot be assured and the risk of potentially compromising 
information reaching the public through EP scrutiny is enhanced (Senior 
stafff member EU Delegation Cairo, 2012, personal communication).
In that sense, it is surprising that increased EP influence might con-
tribute to a further de-politicization of the EU’s relations with the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA), as politically sensitive topics might be 
underaddressed in mutual negotiations. As a result of the disillusionment 
over the ‘politicized’ approach of the 1995 Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, 
the EU has concentrated its MENA relations more and more on ‘technical 
cooperation’ (Bauer, 2011: 420; Holden, 2011). In accordance with the EU 
Commission’s own credo, ‘[t]he most efffective way of achieving change [in 
the region] is […] a positive and constructive partnership with governments, 
based on dialogue, support and encouragement’ (European Commission, 
2001: 8), the construction of democratic façades was all too often celebra-
ted as ‘substantive progress’. A bit of increased electoral freedoms here, 
combined with considerable economic liberalization there were welcomed 
and praised as the Amman, Cairo, or Damascus Spring in the early 2000s 
(Völkel, 2014: 266). For sure, the EU succeeded in assuring stability for itself, 
but it mainly failed in its aspirations to contribute to democratization and 
higher standards for human rights in the region.2 
In fact, it soon became clear that EU attempts to ‘transform the region 
into an area of peace, democracy, stability, and prosperity’ (Noi, 2012: 63) not 
only failed, but that these effforts actually helped strengthen authoritarian 
regimes in the region (Durac and Cavatorta, 2009: 11fff.). Demands for serious 
political reforms in the MENA region were postponed ‘with the fear that 
rapid democratic transformation would most probably lead to instability 
through violent upheaval and civil war, bringing anti-Western Islamist 
parties to power and perhaps causing a rise in terrorist activities’ (Noi, 2012: 
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73). Furthermore, with the creation of the Union for the Mediterranean 
(UfM) in 2008, the EU claimed ‘a growing role of southern countries in 
its work in order to underline their co-ownership of the process’ (Emara, 
2010: 199). These measures ultimately gave these regimes more power 
(Reiterer, 2009: 322) and enhanced their hitherto low sense of ownership 
in the process (Comelli, 2010: 396). Though driven by good intentions, a 
negative outcome was that ‘the institutional set-up elevates Arab regimes 
to become formal veto-players, and the prioritized policy areas have – from 
an Arab regime perspective – the advantage of being de-politicized and 
stripped of any ambitious macro-political goals such as democratization’ 
(Schlumberger, 2011: 135).3 
2.2 EU migration policies: external afffairs seen through the 
interior ministers’ eyes
The EU’s focus on security diluted the concept of ‘a ring of well-governed 
countries’ (European Council, 2003: 8) to a concept of a ring of ‘well-enough-
governed countries’.4 By including immigration, asylum, and visa policies 
in the fĳ irst pillar, thereby subsuming these policies to the EU’s Area of 
Freedom, Security, and Justice (AFSJ), ‘a strong emphasis was placed on 
the need to develop an “external dimension of JHA for the EU”’ (Longo, 
2013: 40; internal quote refers to Monar, 2004). One outflow of this was the 
‘quasi-militarization of European external borders with the erection of 
fences at Ceuta and Melilla, the creation of Frontex, the EU external border 
control agency, and the installation of an early-warning radar system, e.g. 
along the Spanish coast’ (Caillault, 2012: 137).
This security-driven approach to migration5 (Bigo, 2009; Huysmans and 
Squire, 2009; Kaunert and Léonard, 2012: 2f.; Vollmer, 2011) also resulted 
from the fact that the two main actors in the conception of EU migration 
policy ‘have been the European Commission’s Directorate-General for 
Home Afffairs (DG Home) and the Council’s High Level Working Group 
on Migration and Asylum (HLWG)’ (Carrera, 2013) but not external afffairs 
actors. Primarily interior ministers led negotiations in the mid-1980s over 
the Schengen Agreement, a process that placed considerable emphasis on 
the internal security dimension of free border crossing. This set the overall 
tone of migration policy and even today, ‘EU Home Afffairs policy makers 
remain very much in the driver’s seat of the external dimensions of the EU’s 
migration policy agenda, which de facto means Ministries of Interior-like 
actors playing at diplomats’ (Carrera, 2013; emphasis in original). Conse-
quently, in 2011, it was the DG Home which 
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took the lead in drafting the Communication on a dialogue for migration, 
mobility, and security with the Southern Mediterranean countries, […], 
while the EEAS was, to a large extent, sidelined in this decision-making 
process. It is not only in the internal preparation of the Dialogues, but also in 
the negotiations with third countries that DG Home Afffairs has been taking 
a leading role. It is DG Home and not the EEAS that has led the majority 
of diplomatic missions abroad to promote and discuss the content of the 
Mobility Partnerships and the EU’s ‘insecurity approach’ to migration from 
North Africa (Carrera, 2013).
The struggle between foreign and interior politicians within the EU frame-
work also became visible in the aftermath of the political changes that took 
place in Egypt and Tunisia in early 2011. In effforts to reposition herself to the 
new situation, HR/VP Catherine Ashton presented the EU’s new Mediterra-
nean Strategy ‘A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the 
Southern Mediterranean’ (PfDSP) on 8 March 2011 (European Commission, 
2011a). On 25 May 2011, the Commission tabled a comprehensive revision 
of the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy, ‘A New Response 
to a Changing Neighbourhood’ (European Commission, 2011b). Behind 
the façades of unifĳ ied external action, however, Italy and France started 
struggling – mainly through their Interior Ministries in the Justice and 
Home Afffairs Council and with reference to Article 2(2) of the Convention 
implementing the Schengen Agreement – with how to deal with increased 
inflows of irregular migrants from North Africa. Denmark began discussing 
the re-introduction of custom controls, while Germany, the Netherlands 
and others demanded the right to reinstate border controls. In short, some 
EU governments anticipated recanting one of the EU’s central and most 
appreciated achievements, the abolishment of internal border controls.6
In line with the approach of depoliticizing its collaboration, the EU 
increasingly concentrated on economic cooperation with the MENA region. 
The general credo of liberalization was intended to sow the terrain for all 
cooperation activities in the economic sphere. Despite some successes, 
improved trade relations and EU-induced liberalization policies also brought 
economic problems to the MENA countries. These include a squeeze-out of 
the middle class, reduced social security, and the unfettered accumulation 
of wealth among the leading classes (Reynaert, 2011: 629f.). These economic 
inequalities have become, ‘together with a lack of liberty, the root cause for 
the revolutions and the protests in the region’ (Reynaert, 2011: 630). It was 
not by coincidence that ‘[t]he “Arab Spring” began in Tunisia and Egypt, two 
countries where new economic policies inspired by “orthodox” and “neoli-
158
COMPARATIVE MIGRATION STUDIES
CMS 2014, VOL. 2, NO. 2
beral” recipes over the years had increasingly eroded the existing relatively 
egalitarian social contract and coalitions reflecting it’ (Kienle, 2012: 549). 
Hirschman’s (1970) dictum of people protesting with either their feet or 
their voice was confĳirmed once again by the events in Tunisia, Egypt and 
Libya beginning in December 2010. People not only took out to the streets 
but also left their countries, making use of the collapsed border and coastal 
controls. Indeed, the year 2011 saw a dramatic increase of irregular migration 
from North Africa into the EU, especially from Libya and Tunisia, with sky-
rocketing numbers of asylum applications lodged in the EU especially by 
Tunisians (+911% in 2011 compared to 2010), Libyans (+293%), and Egyptians 
(+85%).7 However, scholars like Fargues (2011) stress that the rise in numbers 
was not as dramatic as politicians like to pretend, especially not in the long 
run. In 2012, the total number of detected illegal border crossings into the EU 
fell by 50 per cent compared to 2011, from c. 150,000 to c. 73,000 (Frontex, 2013: 
5). With regard to the central Mediterranean area in particular, the decline 
was even greater at 82 per cent, from 59,000 to 10,379 (Frontex, 2013: 18), and 
in the western Mediterranean, the numbers decreased by 24 per cent to 
6,397, falling roughly the level of the years 2008 and 2010 (Frontex, 2013: 20).8
2.3 Mobility partnerships and readmission agreements as 
questionable ‘carrots’ for third countries
One of the most lucrative EU offfers for the ‘good performers’ among the 
Arab transformation countries are mobility partnerships. The principal 
idea behind these mobility partnerships is to offfer more access to Europe 
in exchange for improved border-protection cooperation, which includes 
the signing of readmission agreements. In addition to the ‘advanced status’ 
partner country Morocco, the Arab Spring shifted the spotlight on to Tunisia 
and Egypt as possible new mobility partnership addressees (Maroukis 
and Triandafyllidou, 2013: 2). Tunisia, motivated by the ‘advanced status’ 
promise, entered into negotiations and fĳ inally signed the mobility part-
nership on 3 March 2014 (European Commission, 2014). It then joined the 
circle of primarily Eastern European countries that had signed EU mobility 
partnerships, such as Moldova (2008), Georgia (2009) and Armenia (2011). In 
contrast, the Egyptian government directly refused the request (European 
Commission, 2013b: 12). Seeberg (2012: 14) argues that 
[t]he reason for the Egyptian decline has to do with the fact that the 
Egyptian authorities have stated that they cannot commit to any agreement 
as long as the new political leaders have been unable to take responsibility 
for the question.
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This reflects only one side of the coin. In fact, Egyptian representatives 
perceive the proposed mobility partnership, which aims to reach a readmis-
sion agreement, as benefĳ itting the EU exclusively (Senior stafff member 
League of Arab States, Cairo, 2012, personal communication). A readmission 
agreement would involve the concluding partners agreeing to readmit their 
own nationals, or third nationals that have moved through their territory, 
should they enter or stay irregularly in the agreement partner’s territory. EU 
negotiators consider these agreements useful in cases ‘of irregular migrants, 
whose itinerary, but not their identity, can be established. With readmission 
agreements in place, nationality may no longer be the decisive factor for 
return, if transit through a country can be proved’ (Roig and Huddleston, 
2007: 365).
For Egyptians, however, the full mobility partnership package is per-
ceived as ‘restricted, non-permanent and highly conditional’ (Carrera et 
al., 2012: 13), as the hoped-for visa facilitation cannot be guaranteed by the 
EU (Roig and Huddleston, 2007: 376f.). This is indeed regrettable for both 
sides, as the current procedures for obtaining Schengen visas are for the 
educated Egyptian elite in particular expensive, complicated, and even 
humiliating. A visa reform especially for multiple travellers (business men, 
academics, also students) could make a real diffference here (Senior faculty 
member Cairo University, 2012, personal communication). But all that has 
thus far been offfered is that
[o]n 27 February 2012 the European Commission adopted a Decision esta-
blishing the list of supporting documents to be presented by visa applicants 
in Egypt. From 1 March 2012, all EU Member States require the same set of 
documents from visa applicants wishing to travel to the European Union 
(Schengen area). This measure is a huge simplifĳ ication for the some 120,000 
visa applicants in Egypt, who now no longer face difffering requirements 
(European Commission, 2013b: 12). 
Because the EU internal decision-making structure in the fĳ ield of visa 
issuance is complicated and unpredictable (all Schengen member states 
have to agree, visa facilitations can be retracted on short note, etc.), these 
modest improvements make it only moderately more attractive for southern 
countries to engage in mutual mobility commitments.
If the EU wants to win southern countries’ consent to readmission 
agreements and mobility partnerships, it must offfer more than its migration 
portfolio. This could involve substantial and costly offfers in other areas 
of development cooperation. Senegal, for instance, linked its readmission 
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agreement negotiations with Spain to an additional €15 million in develop-
ment cooperation (Roig and Huddleston, 2007: 378). The example of Turkey, 
as discussed below, is also illustrative of this efffect.
3.  Five paradoxes of the EU’s Mediterranean migration 
policy
Considering the general trend in EU migration policies (security-driven, lit-
tle incentives for third countries), we can identify fĳ ive paradoxes in the EU’s 
migration policy towards third countries, meaning activities and behaviour 
that lead to counterproductive results. Each paradox supports the argument 
that the concentration on security within EU migration policy is the wrong 
approach to combating irregular migration, as it neither reduces the number 
of irregular migrants nor assures the necessary access to EU territory for 
legitimate asylum seekers. Furthermore, in pursuing this approach, the EU 
actually weakens its negotiation position in other policy fĳ ields by granting 
its negotiating partners leverage. Finally, the EU undermines its credibility 
as a human rights advocate that, in turn, makes it easier for autocratic 
rulers to argue against implementing minimum democratic standards in 
their countries.
3.1 The EU chooses a sledgehammer to crack a nut. But it is far 
from hitting the nutshell
The fĳ irst paradox is that the EU is fĳ ighting the problem with the wrong 
means. Since having gone operational, the budget for Frontex has been 
increased from €19.6 million (in 2006) to €93.95 million in 2013 – an incre-
ase of almost 480 per cent.9 This budget is just in addition to the national 
expenses spent by EU Member States on border protection, which in many 
cases also underwent exorbitant increases. The Heinrich Böll Foundation 
calculates that the total costs for the EUROSUR programme will involve 
another €318 million (in its least expensive version) to €913 million (in 
the most expensive version) in addition to annual operating costs (Hayes 
and Vermeulen, 2012: 51). Expenses for the multiple border control related 
initiatives under the €1.4 billion European Security Research programme, 
the European Defence Agency and similar initiatives have to be considered 
too. Hence, in the name of ‘security’, the EU and its member states have 
increased their border-protection spending by multiple-digit percentages, 
despite all the economic turbulence most European states have been subject 
to.
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While the militarization of EU borders through Frontex and the at-
tendant exploding costs might be justifĳ ied by the need to fĳ ight international 
crime (e.g., cross-border weapons and drugs smuggling, human trafffĳicking), 
the same is not true for irregular migration, as most irregular migrants 
within the EU arrive with a valid tourist visa and then simply overstay 
(Triandafyllidou and Ambrosini, 2011: 271f.). Consequently, ‘[f]ocusing on 
border control seems particularly inappropriate given that most African 
irregular migrants actually enter Europe legally, subsequently overstay 
their visa, and only then become irregular in the end’ (Caillault, 2012: 
137). Mediterranean boat migration or Eastern European river crossings, 
meanwhile, make only for a minor share of irregular migration into the 
EU (De Haas, 2007: 4). According to data from the Italian interior ministry,
only 10% of the foreigners who resided illegally in Italy in 2002 had entered 
the country illegally by sea, while 15% had entered the country illegally by 
land, and 75% were overstayers […]. The share of illegal arrivals by sea was 
estimated at 4% in 2004, 14% in 2005, 13% in the fĳ irst six months of 2006 
(Cuttitta, 2007: 3).
Similarly, Coslovi (2007: 2) speaks of 61 to 75 per cent overstayers among all 
irregular residents in Italy for the fĳ irst half of the 2000s, and even Frontex 
(2013: 18) admits ‘that overstaying is a very common modus operandi for 
irregular migration to the EU’. Even if one were to argue that Frontex mi-
litary patrols help mitigate irregular migration, it does so at high costs for 
relatively little outcome, which means the EU principle of proportionality 
is clearly disregarded.10
This critical fĳ inding can also not be refuted with the argument that 
Frontex pursues a homogeneous border management practice rather less 
through practical cooperation in operations but rather through its risk 
analysis activities, as they serve to create – for the fĳ irst time in the history of 
the European Union’s external border – a unifĳ ied image of that very border 
(Kasparek and Wagner, 2012: 190). 
Paying €93.95 million primarily for ‘risk analysis activities’ is questionable 
by any standard. The EU Commission’s Joint Research Centre, located in 
Ispra, Italy, with its seven scientifĳ ic institutes, or the European University 
Institute in Florence and Fiesole would surely welcome a certain share of 
such funding and produce analyses of equal or better quality.
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3.2 The EU pushes more people into clandestine migration
Another paradox result was produced by the introduction of biometric 
Schengen visas in 2012. Martin (2012: 281) has shown that by obliging travel-
lers to register in the upcoming Registered Travellers Programme, the EU 
is ‘extending its capacity to control mobility far beyond its jurisdiction, 
gathering up personal data from ever more countries in the world’. Clearly, 
this poses legal questions for the EU. But it also creates another problem: it 
essentially nudges those non-EU nationals who enter the EU with the intent 
to stay irregularly (i.e., those persons planning to live illegally in the EU 
under any circumstance) to forfeit applying for a Schengen visa (and then 
overstay) and enter clandestinely through the Mediterranean (Member 
of the Secretariat of the European Parliament, Florence, 2012, personal 
communication). They therefore avoid having their fĳ ingerprints registered 
in an EU-wide database, which makes identifying their nationality much 
easier and therefore increases the risk of being sent back once found in 
Europe. In the absence of clear documentation, the long-lasting procedures 
involved with identifying an illegal migrant and proving nationality or 
origin increases a migrant’s chances of remaining in Europe. As Düvell 
(2011: 293) pointed out, 
a signifĳ icant (unintended) efffect of limiting regular immigration and 
restricting employment is that migration is driven into informal, shadow 
and niche activities. These fĳ indings show that despite the political intention 
of preventing and reducing irregular migration various legislations instead 
contribute to its emergence.
This implies that more fatalities will be the consequence, it seems the 
EU is creating the very irregular migrants it then tries to push back with 
massive investments in Frontex and upscale border protection technology. 
Unsurprisingly, at the EU’s eastern border, ‘many more migrants opted for 
clandestine entry (hiding in lorries or trains) during 2012 compared to 2011’ 
(Frontex, 2013: 27). A certain share of these migrants can presumably be 
attributed to the introduction of biometric Schengen visa. 
The introduction of biometric data has also been associated with the 
increasing number of desperate attempts to avoid documentation. Grant 
(2011: 148) tells the story of a young man residing illegally in the EU who 
‘used a lit cigarette to burn the fĳ ingerprints offf his ten fĳ ingers […] to prevent 
his prints being checked against migration databases, such as EURODAC, 
and to avoid return to a country of feared persecution’.11
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A similar efffect, namely the push of possible migrants from regular into 
irregular options, can occasionally be observed on the national level. For 
example, Italy’s 
misuse of the existing quota system tends to increase the chances of beco-
ming a legal resident migrant for an undocumented migrant who is already 
in Italy, than for a potential migrant who is trying to gain legal access to the 
Italian labour market from abroad (Maroukis and Triandafyllidou, 2013: 3).
Following the conclusion of the Egypt-Italy readmission agreement in 2007, 
some 5,000 Egyptian nationals illegally residing in Italy were legalised 
(Migration expert, Cairo, 2012, personal communication). This sent the 
message to people outside the EU that it was easier to enter Italy irregularly 
and hope for subsequent legalization than to enter by offfĳ icial means and 
apply for a regular work permit from the outset. Reliable numbers for the 
entire EU are difffĳ icult to assemble, but Rosenblum (2010: 1) speaks of ap-
proximately fĳ ive million formerly irregular migrants since the 1980s whose 
status has since been legalized within the EU.12
3.3 The EU makes irregular migration more dangerous and 
contributes to higher death toll
Frontex’ successful narrowing of key migration routes in the Mediterranean 
through enhanced control of the shortest (and hence mostly favoured) 
transfer stretches is schizophrenic, as it must be presumed that it does not 
reduce the number of clandestine migrants, but simply diverts the routes. 
Already in 2006, a 
briefĳ ing to the European Parliament concluded that effforts to curb the 
number of migrants trying to reach Europe had not led to a decrease in the 
number of irregular migrants; instead, they have had the efffect of displacing 
migration from one place to another and were accompanied by an increa-
sing number of fatalities at the EU’s external borders (Grant, 2011: 140). 
Given that full control of the entire Mediterranean area is impossible, 
closing up the shortest paths to EU entry, namely the Strait of Gibraltar 
between Morocco and Spain or the Strait of Sicily between Tunisia and 
Italy/Malta, has led to a diversion of migrants’ routes and an extension of 
the transfer distances. For example, Kasparek and Wagner (2012: 185) argue 
that ‘Greece has become the main gate of irregular migration to Europe 
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[…] is partially due to the closure of the routes in the Western Atlantic and 
Central Mediterranean’. 
Spĳkerboer (2007) reaches similar conclusions. Though the reliability 
of available data was (and still is) questionable, he argues that in the case 
of increased border controls and the closure of relatively unproblematic 
transit routes through the Mediterranean, ‘rather than abandoning their 
plans to travel to Europe, these migrants had simply chosen more dangerous 
migration routes, which exposed them to even greater risks’ (Grant, 2011: 
140). The number of deadly incidents in the Mediterranean would therefore 
increase rather than decrease through intensifĳ ied border controls. 
Frontex representatives and supporters of strict border control on the 
side of the EU and the member states understandably see it diffferently, and 
proudly point to statistics showing how the number of irregular migrants 
in the Mediterranean has been reduced through increased control and the 
closure of the most popular boat routes. When, for example, the western 
and central Mediterranean routes were almost closed through increased 
surveillance activities, 
Frontex recorded drops of some 90 per cent in the detection of irregular 
migration on the Central Mediterranean route to Malta and on the West 
African route to the Canary Islands. NGOs also reported steep reductions in 
the number of reported deaths at EU sea borders (Grant, 2011: 139).
However, those arguing these points overlook the fact that the reduced 
numbers counted in the areas under high control were not offfset or even 
outweighed by higher death toll numbers in the high seas beyond their 
control. In principle, juggling with statistics regarding refugee numbers 
in the Mediterranean is difffĳ icult. For example, after the RABIT operation 
took place at the Greek-Turkish border between November 2010 and March 
2011, ‘Frontex did report a decrease in numbers of irregular border crossings. 
However, as this might also be due to the heavy winter, this particular 
statistical data does not allow for a rigid interpretation’ (Kasparek and 
Wagner, 2012: 188).
In efffect, passage routes are growing in length and are increasingly more 
dangerous for refugees. More fatalities must be expected. Or, as Frontex 
(2013: 5) states with regard to the 2012 Greek border-protection upgrade, 
‘[t]here remains the risk of resurgence of irregular migration, since many 
migrants may be waiting for the conclusion of the Greek operations before 
they continue their journey towards Europe’. If that is the case, then once 
again considerable sums are being spent for a hardly satisfying outcome.
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In addition, diverting routes through the Mediterranean involves higher 
fĳ inancial costs for the refugees as professional trafffĳ ickers demand higher 
fees. Human trafffĳ icking thus becomes an even more lucrative activity for 
trafffĳ ickers – as a result of EU policy.
3.4 EU Readmission Agreements result from internal 
requirements, not external necessities
Another paradox involves the EU’s special keenness on concluding EU 
Readmission Agreements (EURA) with third countries. ‘Since 1999, when 
competence in this area was conferred on the European Community, the 
Council has issued negotiating directives to the Commission for 18 third 
countries’ (European Commission, 2011c: 2). These 18 countries mainly 
comprise potential future EU Member States (Western Balkans and Eastern 
Europe) in line with the EU’s ‘concentric circles’ model (Panizzon, 2012: 
102f.), but also illustrative countries such as Georgia, Russia, Pakistan, or 
Hong Kong.13
Once the Commission is tasked with negotiating a readmission agree-
ment with third countries, all EU Member States should stop any national 
negotiations conducted in parallel. However, this is in practice rather 
clumsy, as the interpretation of competence-sharing difffers among various 
EU members (Roig and Huddleston, 2007: 369). The Lisbon Treaty (Article 
79(3), combined with Article 79(1) and 4(2)(j)) left the exact division of 
competences in the area or readmission agreements unspecifĳ ied, and it is 
up to further legal interpretations to decide who should be assigned with 
which negotiation powers and which decision competences (Panizzon, 
2012: 124fff.).
So far, third countries clearly prefer concluding readmission agreements 
with individual EU Member States over the EU. There are two key reasons 
for this: 
Given the higher developmental impact of bilateral migration agreements, 
which unlike EURAs, offfer labour market access quotas in exchange for 
cooperation on readmission we fĳ ind there are justifĳ ied reasons why migrant 
source countries often prefer such bilateral migration agreements over 
EURAs. The preference for bilateralism, however, can also be explained by 
the weak obligations to uphold the human rights of readmitted citizens and 
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In 2013, the fĳ ive North African countries Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya 
and Egypt had readmission agreements with fĳ ive EU Member States in 
diffferent states of negotiation (cf. table 1). The data reveal that there is 
close cooperation against irregular migration especially in the western 
Mediterranean (Morocco with Portugal and Spain) and the central Mediter-
ranean (Algeria, Libya and Tunisia with Italy; Malta is negotiating with 
all close southern neighbours but has to date not successfully concluded 
negotiations). 
Table 1  Agreements linked to readmission between northern and southern Mediterra-
nean countries14
Algeria Egypt Libya Morocco Tunisia
Cyprus - - - - -
France EL 1984-1994   
PC s 2003
n since 200715 f 2007 EL 1983-1993   
PC f 2001
EL 1984-1994   
f 2009 
Greece - PC f 2000 - - PC s 1990
Italy f 2006   
PC s 2009
PC f 2000   
f 2007
AA s 2000   
AA s 2003   
MU s 2006   
PC s 2007   
MU s 2011   
EL 2012 
s 1998 f 1999   
PC s 2003   
AA s 2009   
s 2011
Malta n since 2001 n since 2001 PC 1984   
n since 2001
- n since 2001
Portugal - - - f 2004 -
Spain P f 2004 - - PA 1992   
MU s 2003   
MU s 2007   
PC f 2012   
f 2012   
(of the 1992 
agreement)
-
AA Administrative Arrangement; EL Exchange of Letters; MU Memorandum of Understanding; P Protocol; PA 
Provisional Agreement; PC Police Cooperation Agreement – f in force; n negotiated; s signed.
Given the lack of incentives the EU has to offfer while trying to sign readmis-
sion agreements (due to its dependence on member states’ willingness to 
implement the benefĳits promised to the third countries), it is no surprise 
that no other country could have been convinced to enter into negotiations 
so far. 
[I]t is not so much the EU approach to a third country that determines the 
success or failure of EU external migration policy. Instead, the domestic 
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preferences of the third country concerned condition whether or not its 
government will choose to cooperate with the EU on migration issues’ 
(Reslow, 2012: 394).
Egypt’s hesitation towards an EU readmission agreement (see chapter 2.3) 
is rooted in its unsatisfying experiences with Italy. The readmission agree-
ment between both countries, signed in November 2005 and put into force 
in 2007, has been poorly implemented so far: just a few dozens of Egyptians 
get readmitted per month, a number that deems small compared to the 
thousands of Egyptians believed to be residing illegally in Italy. As there are 
almost no Italians who live illegally in Egypt, the benefĳit for the Egyptian 
government is minimal. In an attempt to provide the Egyptian government 
an incentive to conclude the agreement, the Italian government offfered to 
accept 8,000 qualifĳ ied Egyptian workers with a proper work permit in Italy. 
So far, however, only around 160 Egyptians have been successfully placed, 
mainly because Italy demands standards that Egypt is unable to fulfĳ il, such 
as HACCP hygienic certifĳ icates for gastronomy personnel – which are not 
applied in Egypt (Migration expert, Cairo, 2012, personal communication). 
Hence, the mere existence of a readmission agreement does not neces-
sarily mean that it is applied in practice. For example, despite an existing 
readmission protocol between Turkey and Greece, only 1,281 Turks were 
efffectively readmitted between 2006 and 2010, though Greece has presented 
requests for 62,816 people (Triandafyllidou and Ambrosini, 2011: 258f.).
Among the Mediterranean countries, the EU Commission has negotia-
ted only with Morocco (since April 2003), Tunisia (since 2011), and Turkey 
(since May 2005). In addition, the Commission received a mandate from the 
Council to start negotiations with Algeria in November 2002, but which have 
never started. Negotiations with Tunisia were quick and smooth (see chapter 
2.3), but negotiations with Morocco and Turkey have been long and thorny. 
This was mainly due to two reasons: For one, both governments demanded 
linking the signature of the readmission agreement with a visa facilitation 
agreement (a request that was also made by almost all governments, incl. 
Algeria; yet, only 11 of the 18 EU Readmission Agreements (concluded or 
still under negotiation) indeed contain visa liberalization16). But here, the 
Commission cannot make substantial promises, as visa facilitation must 
be concluded by the Council, and member states have been far from being 
united on the idea of easing access for citizens from the countries concerned. 
Devisscher (2011: 93) observes that in EU readmission negotiations, ‘[w]
here measures have been taken, they are not legally binding and where 
they are, commitments on the part of the Union are weak, while in parallel 
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imposing strict obligations on the third country’. Turkey’s government has 
repeatedly emphasized that it is not willing to implement the readmission 
agreement with the EU even after its signature if visa facilitation is not 
included (Today’s Zaman, 2013). Hence, despite recent successes, with the 
signatures of the Turkish government under the readmission agreement on 
16 December 2013 and Morocco’s signature under an even more encompas-
sing Migration and Mobility Partnership on 7 June 2013, there is plenty of 
due cause for scepticism that the agreements will be put into efffective 
practice (Coleman, 2009: 27fff.).
Another arguable paradox might be seen in the fact that EU Member 
States have been willing to unify their effforts to combat irregular migration 
(excepting the examples elucidated above) but have failed to forge a com-
mon position on how best to steer regular migration. The Blue Card initi-
ative, proposed by the Commission in 2007 and specifĳ ied by the Council’s 
Directive 2009/50/EC in May 2009, aims to improve incentives for regular 
labour immigration but sufffers from ‘the many “mayclauses” that provide 
the member states with wide discretion and, as a consequence, reduce 
the “attractiveness” as initially framed by the Commission’ (Eisele, 2013: 
2). Until the EU Commission proposes more clear incentives for partner 
countries, better results in migration partnership negotiations with third 
countries remain unlikely. The Commission’s next interim report on the 
Blue Card initiative, expected for summer 2014, will hopefully bring some 
improvement here.
Financial expectations also play a role. During its negotiations with the 
EU, Turkey wanted ‘the readmission agreement to include strong funding 
from the EU, mirroring similar funding that is available to EU Member 
States under the “resettlement policies” within the European Refugee Fund’ 
(Kasparek and Wagner, 2012: 186). However, the Commission is limited in 
terms of its capacity to make such offfers, as 
[t]he only instrument that could in principle provide this additional funding 
to third countries is the Thematic Programme for cooperation in the areas 
of migration and asylum. But the Thematic Programme has a very limited 
budget (approximately 54 million EUR annually) and is designed to cover 
cooperation activities world-wide, meaning that the resources potentially 
available for a specifĳ ic third country are very small (European Commission, 
2011c: 7).
Many southern Mediterranean countries have also raised concerns regar-
ding the mandatory ‘Third Country Nationals’ (TCN) clause that obliges 
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the partner countries to not only readmit their own nationals but also 
citizens from third countries that came into the EU via their territory. 
Meanwhile, the governments argue that they cannot be held responsible 
for the behaviour of citizens from other countries, and the EU argues that 
TCN is necessary as countries are also main transit countries for irregu-
lar migrants from other countries. Without such a clause, readmission 
agreements made little sense for the EU (European Commission, 2011c: 9). 
However, it is important to note that even the Commission itself criticizes 
the lengthy process of TCN negotiations and also questions the pressure 
coming from the member states at that point: 
It has been Commission’s experience that by the time the third country 
fĳ inally accepts the principle of a TCN clause, a lot of time will already have 
been lost and further concessions are then necessary in order to agree on 
the precise language and preconditions of the clause, often to the detriment 
of its efffectiveness. To maintain such efffectiveness a use of appropriate 
leverage would have been useful in cases when it is particularly relevant for 
the EU to have a TCN clause included. Readmission of own nationals should 
typically not require important incentives. Interestingly, MS’ bilateral 
readmission agreements seldom include a TCN clause (mainly where there 
is a common land border). Yet MS always demand a TCN clause at EU level 
(European Commission, 2011c: 9).
The high costs and efffort incurred by negotiations, coupled with the fact 
that most readmission activities around the Mediterranean are already 
subject to bilateral agreements (though these are often implemented 
rather loosely) raise the question as to why the EU needs to engage in all 
these negotiations. The reasons for this are related to the institutional 
growth of the EU as a political entity. Since the Treaty of Amsterdam, which 
places asylum and visa issues within the European Community’s sphere 
of responsibilities, since the implementation of the Schengen Agreement 
and later the Stockholm Programme in 2009 and, most recently, since the 
EU level has been affforded more power in external afffairs through the 
creation of the HR/VP and the EEAS, it is only logical that the EU should 
also work towards a common border-protection policy and address the 
return of irregular migrants. The creation of Frontex in 2004 is the most 
visible manifestation of this idea. 
However, this is neither the problem of the negotiation partners, nor 
does it fĳ ind the unqualifĳ ied support of all EU Member States. Greece, Italy, 
and Malta, each of which are at the forefront of clandestine migration in 
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the central Mediterranean, have had problems with the unifĳ ied border-
protection approach. In particular, they have voiced concerns about their 
national agreements and border-protection measurements being chal-
lenged (Kasparek and Wagner, 2012). This current ‘dual’ state of afffairs, in 
which readmission agreements are pursued at both the EU and individual 
member-state level allows participating third countries to play each level 
against the other. Thus, as long as EU competences in this regard remain 
poorly defĳined, the EU will continue to undermine its noble effforts to speak 
with one voice in external relations.
3.5 The EU is losing ground in very important negotiations
The EU’s insistence on negotiating and reaching readmission agreements 
leads to a fĳ ifth paradox that deserves consideration here: The EU unneces-
sarily loses arbitration ground in other negotiations. As happened between 
Senegal and France, ‘[r]eadmission has already proven to be an obstacle in 
bilateral agreements and almost caused the failure of the negotiations on 
the accord de gestion concertée des flux migratoires’ (Reslow, 2012: 408).
This problem also arises in EU negotiations. The insistence on things 
that the partner government cannot (or does not want to) fulfĳ il casts 
long shadows on parallel negotiations. In the wake of the Arab Spring, for 
example, people in North Africa often felt that the EU perceived them as 
‘“areas of risks”, not partners or friends’ (Bauer, 2011: 425). As a result, a sense 
of mistrust regarding the EU’s real intentions spread among North African 
populations, and complaints were often expressed about the EU preaching 
democracy but meaning stability. 
The EU’s insistence on ‘unfulfĳ illable’ conditions and requests make an 
already difffĳ icult situation even more difffĳ icult for the negotiators on both 
sides, and unnecessarily so. This is even more astonishing when considering 
the ‘relevance’ of migration in the overall negotiations between the EU 
and individual partner countries. Egypt, for example, is not a signifĳ icant 
country of origin, though ‘[r]ecently a rise in migration to Europe – mostly 
irregular – especially Italy and France, has been recorded’ (Badawy et al., 
2013: 75). Despite having a population larger than that of all other four 
North African states combined (c. 86 million in Egypt, c. 80 million in 
Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia), only 224,122 Egyptians reside in the 
EU, compared to 4,464,963 Egyptian migrants in total who mainly live and 
work in the Arab Gulf countries. This means that only fĳ ive per cent of all 
Egyptian migrants live in the EU, most of them in Italy (Bartunkova and 
Völkel, 2010: 14). This is in clear contrast to Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia 
from where roughly 90% of migrants make their life in the EU (cf. table 2). 
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Also, in absolute numbers, there are clearly fewer Egyptians than people 
from the Maghreb living in Europe. Overall, with a total of 4.6 million, 
North Africans comprise approximately 20 per cent of the total 23 million 
immigrants who live in the EU.
Table 2 Emigration from North Africa to the EU compared to total numbers (Fargues, 2013: 
6)
Algeria Egypt Libya Morocco Tunisia TOTAL
in EU 877,398 224,122 66,344 3,056,109 414,077 4,638,050
overall 961,850 4,464,963 100,565 3,371,979 466,595 9,365,952
% in EU 91.2% 5.0% 66.0% 90.6% 88.7% 49.5%
Given these relatively low numbers, it is not surprising that Egypt has 
not pursued a stringent migration policy in its relations with the EU in 
particular. Indeed, the Egyptian government has, in principle, been more 
interested in technical than ‘political’ cooperation (Senior stafff member 
Egyptian Ministry of International Cooperation, Cairo, 2012, personal 
communication). With the demise of the Mubarak regime and the series 
of interim governments that followed, any migration-steering measures 
were put on ice. In the absence of a long-term perspective and as short-term 
domestic topics dominated the political agendas, negotiations with the EU 
came to a halt (Senior faculty member American University in Cairo, 2012, 
personal communication).17 
The only migration-related issues relevant for Egypt are the high levels of 
remittances from workers abroad and the ease of the domestic job market 
through the ‘export’ of labour. Though scientifĳ ic evidence for their exact 
efffectiveness is difffĳ icult to furnish (Nassar, 2008), remittances are the third 
biggest source of income for the Egyptian budget, after revenues from the 
Suez Canal and tourism, totalling up to 4 per cent of GDP (Bartunkova and 
Völkel, 2010: 15). As tourism drops to unprecedented low record numbers, 
and as the income generated by the Suez Canal declines (Egypt Indepen-
dent, 2013), the income from Egyptians abroad is growing in importance. 
However, because most remittances are arriving from guest workers in Gulf 
countries, it is unlikely that the Egyptian government will be very keen on 
regulating Mediterranean migration into the EU in the near future – even 
if (according to opinion polls) more Egyptians are expressing the desire to 
emigrate during this period of political and economic turmoil.
Finally, the will to cooperate with southern Mediterranean countries 
in the fĳ ight against irregular migration bears some risks for the EU as it at-
tempts to strengthen and support human rights. According to the European 
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Commission (2011c: 12), readmission agreements with countries exhibiting a 
poor human rights record lead to massive criticism and major policy dilem-
mas. To resolve this problem, the Commission recommended introducing 
‘a suspension clause [in the readmission agreements] for persistent human 
rights violations in the third country concerned’ (European Commission, 
2011c: 12). However such safeguard clauses would generate the next paradox: 
Given that none of the regimes in North Africa adequately guarantee respect 
for human rights, with the possible exception of Tunisia, why should the 
EU run the risk of concluding agreements whose implementation it cannot 
guarantee? Moreover, why should the EU load another burden on its shoul-
der, as it would have to defend its cooperation in the fĳ ight against irregular 
migration with backhanded governments? The European Parliament’s 
move in early 2013 to stop any support for Egypt due to its questionable 
performance in terms of ensuring democratic standards has clearly shown 
what the consequences of such an approach are: constant worry and a 
constant source of disputes. Given the already poorly satisfying results of 
EU-MENA relations and negotiations, this approach would constitute an 
unnecessary stumbling block that hinders rather than helps.
4. Conclusions
In 2014, the last year of the Stockholm Programme, much is at stake with 
the EU’s migration policy. Many steps have been taken by the European 
Commission and the EU Member States that have produced, at best, ques-
tionable results: 
Instead of reducing migration, intensifĳ ied border controls have led to a rise 
in irregular migration, the use of new and more dangerous migration routes, 
thus increasing the risks and costs for the migrants involved, and leasing to 
the professionalization of smuggling methods (Caillault, 2012: 137f.).
The Commission has tried to react quickly to the altered circumstances in 
its Arab neighbourhood since 2011 (Teti, 2012). Nonetheless, it is still strug-
gling to fĳ ind the best strategy to improve cooperation with the southern 
Mediterranean countries in the fĳ ield of border protection (Völkel, 2014). 
The Commission’s Communication on the Global Approach to Migration 
and Mobility of November 2011 is indicative of this struggle. It proposes a 
Common Agenda on Migration and Mobility as a ‘light alternative’ for those 
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countries that are not willing to sign a full-fledged mobility partnership. 
Clearly, the EU wants a lot, but it has little to offfer (Reslow, 2012: 414).
It is clear that when concentrating on border protection alone, ‘the ef-
fectiveness of both unilateral and multilateral policies to regulate forced 
migration flows is limited’ (Thielemann, 2012: 21). But despite this insight, 
continuing to treat migration from North Africa as a potential security 
threat ‘has damaged the EU’s credibility in terms of the promotion of de-
mocracy and human rights’ (Freyburg, 2012: 141). The EU’s support of North 
African dictators for the sake of stability has damaged its reputation among 
the Arab public and has negative consequences for its role as a political 
power and peace broker in the region. Credibility is crucial for diplomatic 
success (Völkel, 2008: 19f.), and the EU’s credibility has sufffered considerably 
due to the EU’s over-emphasis on Arab (and sub-Saharan) migrants as a 
potential security threat. In short, the EU’s pursuit of domestic interests 
has efffaced its diplomatic efffectiveness in migration policy. 
So, what is needed? For one, migration must not be perceived through 
the lens of security interests exclusively. The EU, with its demographic 
problems, should surely see migration fĳ irst and foremost as an opportunity 
to compensate for the lack of workers. However, the continuing growth 
of populist movements and right-wing parties in Europe will make this 
difffĳ icult. Even more importantly, there is an urgent need in these times of 
European crisis to conduct honest and sober discussions about the risks 
and opportunities inherent to migration.
Second, the ongoing humanitarian catastrophe in the Mediterranean 
with thousands of lives lost at sea each year should prompt a serious re-
thinking of existing practices. The trend in recent years towards tightening 
rather than loosening visa policies is clearly misguided and wrong-headed. 
All too often, this approach simply compels individuals to choose irregular 
entry into the EU and does not lead to a factual reduction of influx numbers.
Third, it is time for concrete improvements in immigration policy to be 
made by EU and member-state decision-makers. Hopefully, revision talks 
about the Stockholm succession programme will allow for the Blue Card 
initiative to be fully implemented. Also, the competence dispute in the 
fĳ ield of readmission agreements between the Commission and member 
states must be clarifĳ ied.
Finally, the EU can make use of the existing stock of tools at its hands 
to help improve the performance of North African decision-makers in the 
fĳ ield of migration. Awareness-raising and capacity-building effforts for mid-
level public administration is a worthy initiative, especially with regard 
to reintegration programmes for returning (irregular as well as regular) 
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migrants (Senior stafff member IOM Cairo, 2012, personal communication). 
Suitable offfers are available through TAIEX and Twinning but have yet to 
fĳ ind resonance among potential partners (Senior stafff member Ministry of 
International Cooperation Cairo, 2012, personal communication). Raising 
awareness about how to make use of such campaigns is therefore advisable 
here.
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Notes
1. Article 6 TEU states that the EU ‘recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights’.
2. Freyburg (2012) has shown for the case of Morocco, that the EU, by externalizing its migration 
policy regime onto countries south of the Mediterranean, “exports” three core principles 
of democratic governance, namely transparency, accountability, and participation (to 
diffferent extents, though).
3. The predominant concentration of UfM actors on the Israel/Palestine conflict, leading to 
the paralyzation of almost all UfM activities, can be seen as illustrative evidence.
4. Kausch and Youngs (2009: 967) speak of ‘fĳirmly governed states’.
5. Interestingly enough, migration policy aspects are listed in EU country progress reports 
under headline 5: Cooperation on Justice, Freedom and Security, and not under the chapters 
‘Political Dialogue’ or ‘People-to-People contacts’, where migration could also be very well 
subsumed. 
6. For example, the Netherlands decided to reinstall surveillance cameras along the Dutch 
borders (Rettman, 2012).
7. UNHCR 2012 data. It must be noted that in absolute terms, most asylum applications in 2011 
of Mediterranean countries came from Syria (6,725), followed by Tunisia (5,248) and Algeria 
(4,062). Libya (2,710) and Egypt (1,994), meanwhile, remained of only minor importance. 
8. Despite the decreasing immigration numbers from North Africa, the European Commission 
(2013a: 3) noted that ‘[w]hile the total number of asylum applications remained well below 
the peak of 425 000 in 2001, there was an increase of 9.7 % compared to 2011 in the total 
number of asylum applicants in 2012, amounting to just over 330 000, primarily resulting 
from an increased influx of asylum seekers from Syria’.
9. See the Frontex budget data at http://www.frontex.europa.eu/assets/About_Frontex/
Governance_documents/Budget/Budget_2013.pdf (last visited 2 May 2013). 
10. See on Immigration Detention and Proportionality also Flynn (2011).
11. EURODAC ‘is a database containing the fĳ ingerprints of asylum-seekers, which is used to 
ascertain whether (and in which EU Member State) a given asylum-seeker has already 
175 
 MONEY FOR NOTHING, THE CRICKS FOR FREE
VÖLKEL
applied for asylum in the EU. It has been operational since January 2003’ (Kaunert and 
Léonard, 2012: 11).
12. Though it is unclear how many of them were simply turned into regular immigrants through, 
for instance, the accession of their home country as new member state to the EU.
13. See the complete list in European Commission (2011c: 2fff.).
14. Data as of February 2013, taken from the Return Migration and Development Platform (RDP), 
http://rsc.eui.eu/RDP (accessed 2 August 2013).
15. This date is not included in the RDP database but accrues from Mourad (2008).
16. cf. the list at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-afffairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/
visa-policy/index_en.htm (accessed 8 April 2014).
17. However, it seems that the government under President Mohamed Morsi has recognized 
the relevance of (regular) migration for the country’s development, as in 2012 Egypt ‘started 
preparations for a household survey on migration, to be carried out in 2013’ (European 
Commission, 2013b: 11). The toppling of Morsi on 3 July 2013 has fĳ inished this enterprise 
for the moment. 
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